Abstract-We propose a new game theoretic approach to estimate a binary random variable based on a vector of sensor measurements that may be corrupted by an adversary. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum partial information game in which a detector attempts to minimize the probability of error and an attacker attempts to maximize this probability. Explicit mixed policies are computed using the matrix form of the game and exploiting sensor symmetry to reduce complexity and find closed-form solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded sensing [17] , computation, and communication have enabled the proliferation of sophisticated sensing devices for a wide range of applications that include safety monitoring, health-care related applications, surveillance, traffic monitoring, military applications, and cyber-physical systems [7] . While computer-based networked sensors provide a tremendous level of flexibility for these applications, they also introduce significant security vulnerabilities because a sensor can be compromised without physical access to the device. Of particular concern are scenarios in which an attacker infiltrates a sensing device and manipulates its output in a manner that cannot be easily detected by the system. These compromised sensors are referred to as Byzantine [11] and can affect the ability of the decision maker to estimate the variables being measured. Such scenarios force system designers to re-think basic estimation problems [13] in light of network security concerns.
In traditional estimation problems one attempts to determine the value of a variable that cannot be measured directly based on a set of "noisy" measurements of that variable. Typically, some form of probabilistic structure is assumed to model how the measurements relate to the true value of the variable to be estimated. This type of framework is adequate, e.g., when the measurements fluctuate around the variable's true value due to microscopic thermal fluctuations. However, things can be quite different in scenarios where measurement can be controlled by an entity that actively attempts to degrade the estimation process.
The most basic mechanism to overcome stochastic measurements errors relies on the use of redundancy. When *This material is based upon work supported in part by ARO MURI Grant number W911NF0910553. multiple sensors provide redundant and independent measurements about a variable that needs to be estimated, the confidence on the estimate increases with the number of sensors. When some of these sensors are under control of an adversary that wants to maximize the estimation error, the independence assumption is generally not valid and the probability of an estimation error scales differently with the number of sensors. The goal of this paper is to provide insights regarding what happens in such situations.
To focus our attention on the issues that arise when one needs to do estimation using potentially compromised sensors, we consider a prototypical problem in which one wants to estimate the value of a binary random variable based on measurements provided by a group of binary sensors. We assume that such measurements incorporate two types of errors: purely stochastic errors that are responsible for bitflips with a pre-specified probability, and adversarial errors that are controlled by an adversary that has infiltrated a subset of the sensors. Which sensors have been infiltrated is not known a-priori to the system. We shall see that the (optimal) adversarial errors may actually be stochastic (corresponding to mixed policies), with probability distributions carefully selected by the attacker to maximize the probability of estimation error. In general, these distributions will be a function of the value of the variable to be estimated. The adversarial estimation problem described above is formulated as a zero-sum game between a player that wants to estimate the binary random variable with minimal probability of error, henceforth called the detector, and a player that wants to maximize the same probability of error, henceforth called the attacker. This is a game of partial information [4] , [9] , [14] in that the detector only has access to the "noisy" sensor measurements that have been corrupted both by stochastic and by adversarial errors. Similarly, the attacker also only has partial information since we assume that, while she knows the true value of the variable to be estimated, she does not know the values of the measurements that are being reported by the sensors that she has not infiltrated.
There are three main contributions in the paper. The first contribution of our approach with respect to classic problems of Byzantine faults is that we do not assume perfect sensors, i.e., even the sensors that have not been manipulated can produce incorrect results, which is common in the security domain. The second involves the definition of the adversarial detection problem as a zero-sum partial information game. The third is how to use policy domination and discover matrix symmetries to reduce the ramification of the problem and finally find closed-form solutions for the defender and attacker policies for plausible ranges of the parameters under consideration.
By expanding the game into its matrix form and exploiting sensor symmetry to reduce complexity, we can obtain optimal estimation policies for the detector and optimal sensor manipulation policies for the attacker. Policy domination is used to reduce the apparent exponential complexity of the problem, eventually leading to simple detection and attack policies.
To model the fact that the detector may not be certain whether or not an attacker may actually be infiltrating some of the sensors, we introduce a "probability of attack" parameter p attack that reflects how certain the detector is about the existence of a malicious attacker. An interesting feature of the solution obtained is that the optimal estimation policy is largely insensitive to this parameter. This is convenient because p attack would typically be hard to guess.
Related Work
Several game-theoretic approaches [4] , [16] have been proposed for wired networks, WLANs, sensor networks, and ad hoc networks. A similar idea of the present paper has been investigated in [8] , by solving the game as a pair of dual linear programming problems and presenting closed form solutions for special cases. These solutions captured the Jones' Lemma. In [3] the authors propose a game theoretic approach to intrusion detection in distributed virtual sensor networks, where each agent in the network has imperfect detection capabilities. This interaction between the defender and the attacker is modeled as a noncooperative non-zero sum game. A two-player noncooperative, non-zerosum game has also been studied in [1] and [2] to address attack-defense problems in sensor networks. Kodialam et al. [10] proposed to model intrusion detection as a zero-sum game between the service provider and the intruder. The optimal solution for both players is to play the minimax strategy of the game. Game theoretic solutions for ad hoc networks based on cooperation and selfishness of the network have been reported in [15] , [18] , where each node decides whether to forward or not a packet based on appropriate payoff functions. Researchers in [12] consider a denial-ofservice attack game where an attacker is trying to deface the homepage on a given web server. A stochastic game approach is proposed between the network administrator and the attacker where, at each time step, both players choose their actions and then the game moves to a new state according to some probability that depends on the chosen actions. The authors have shown that the game admits multiple Nash equilibria. The strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker whose target is not known, is considered in [5] , where the authors investigate centralized/decentralized defensive actions and also categorize some targets as unimportant by increasing the attractiveness of other ones to the attacker.
Organization
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we provide a description of the problem. Section III discusses how one can use symmetry to reduce the complexity of the problem and Section IV contains the main results of the paper, providing optimal detection and attack policies. A discussion of the results is provided in Section V. Finally, in Section VI we conclude the paper and discuss future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The goal of this paper is to estimate the value of a binary random variable X with Bernoulli distribution
. . , Y n q of n binary "noisy" sensor measurements, where the measurements Y i , i P t1, 2, . . . , nu are assumed conditionally independent and identically distributed (iid), given X. Specifically,
where p err P r0, 1s denotes a per-sensor error probability. Setting us apart from standard estimation problems [13] , we consider a scenario where an estimateX of X needs to be constructed based on version Z -pZ 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n q of the measurement vector Y that may have been "corrupted" by an attacker. It is assumed that, with a given probability p attack P r0, 1s, the attacker manipulated the readings of m ď n sensors. Which sensors and in what way could the attacker have manipulated them is discussed below. The probability p attack P r0, 1s should be viewed as a design parameter that reflects how certain the detector is that the measurements have been manipulated. For p attack " 0, we recover a standard estimation problem.
The game under consideration is a partial information game for both players. The detector must select its estimatê X based solely on the vector Z of possibly corrupted sensor readings, which corresponds to the selection of an estimation policy µ : t0, 1u n Ñ t0, 1u that is used to compute the estimateX " µpZq.
Since the domain of µ has 2 n elements and its codomain has 2 elements, the set U of all possible estimation policies contains 2 p2 n q policies.
We assume that the attacker knows the true value of X and bases her decision on which sensors to compromise and how to corrupt their measurements as a function of X. However, the attacker is not assumed to know the values reported by the remaining sensors, thus also suffering from partial information. We can thus view an attack policy as a pair of functions δ which : t0, 1u Ñ S m n and δ how : t0, 1u Ñ t0, 1u m , where S m n denotes the set of all ordered subsets of t1, 2, . . . , nu with m elements, with the understanding that 
The model just described is illustrated in Figure 1 and allow us to define adversarial estimation as a zero-sum game in which the detector selects a policy µ P U and the attacker a policy δ P D so to minimize and maximize, respectively, the probability of error
where the subscript µ,δ in the probability measure emphasizes the fact that the probability of error depends on the players' policies. Since the sets of policies are finite, we have a (finite) matrix game defined by the matrix
where a ij denotes the probability of error in (1) corresponding to the ith estimation policy in U and the jth attack policy in D. In general, this game does not have pure saddle-point equilibria so the players will seek for mixed policies, which correspond to selecting probability distributions over the sets of actions U and D.
III. SYMMETRIC GAMES
Since all sensors are equal in their probability of error and in their vulnerability to attacks, all entries of the vector Y and Z should be treated similarly by the attacker and the detector, respectively. This allows one to significantly reduce the size of the matrix game:
1) The estimation policy µpZq should only depend on the total number of 0's and 1's in the vector Z and therefore can be written as
for some functionμ : t0, 1, . . . , nu Ñ t0, 1u. The total number of such functions is given by 2 n`1 . 2) For the attack policies, all sensor selection functions δ which pXq are equally good and can therefore be selected with equal probability. Moreover, the function δ how pXq only needs to decide how many sensors will be set equal to 0 and how many will be set equal to 1, with the understanding that these 0s and 1s will be distributed with equal probability among the sensors selected. The selection of how many sensors will be set equal to 0 corresponds to the selection of a function δ #0 : t0, 1u Ñ t0, 1, . . . , mu. The total number of such functions is given by pm`1q 2 .
These observations lead to a zero-sum game defined by a matrixĀ that is only 2 n`1ˆp m`1q 2 , with one row for each policyμ and one column for each policyδ how . The following result, proved in the Appendix, can be used to compute such matrix.
Lemma 1: When the detector utilizes a policy µpZq of the form (3) and the attacker a policy δpXq that tries to set to 0 and to 1 a number of sensors equal toδ #0 pXq and mδ #0 pXq, respectively, we obtain the following probability of error:
l
IV. MAIN RESULT
It turns out that the exponential complexity in the number of sensors n can be removed using policy domination. For simplicity of presentation, we show this for the case where it is equally likely that X is 0 or 1 (i.e., p " 1{2) and the number of sensors is odd (allowing for tie-breaking). In this case, we can provide explicit formulas for mixed saddlepoint policies and for the value of the game. This result is formulated in terms of the following (pure policies): 1) We define the detector's majority rule to be the pure policy µpZq of the form (3), defined bȳ
which corresponds to deciding onX " 0 if more than half the sensors reported the value 0. 2) We define the detector's no-consensus rule to be the pure policy µpZq of the form (3), defined bȳ
This somewhat unexpected policy is like the majority rule, except that if all sensors agree on a particular value, the estimateX should take the opposite value. 3) We define the attacker's deception rule to be the pure policy δ deception pXq that, when X " 0 sets all m sensors equal to 1 and when X " 1 sets all m sensors equal to 0. 4) We define the attacker's no-deception rule to be the pure policy δ no´deception pXq that, when X " 0 sets all m sensors equal to 0 and when X " 1 sets all m sensors equal to 1. The following simple proposition is needed to prove Theorem 1.
Proposition
p1´p e q˙. l Theorem 1: Suppose that p " 1{2, the number of sensors n is odd, and
.
In this case, the value of the game is given by
and a mixed saddle-point policy corresponds to selecting
where
and Π : R Ñ R denotes the projection function
Πpxq "
l V. DISCUSSION This section evaluates the proposed scheme in terms of the profits for the attacker and the defender. A scenario is set as follows: there are n " 3 sensors with error probabilities p error " 0.21, probability of attack p attack " 0.4652 and m " 1 attacker. The game matrix is constructed based on (4) with p " 1{2 and size 16ˆ4. It is easy to see that the inequalities (5)- (7) are satisfied. This problem has a small number of sensors and can be solved relatively fast without any policy domination, with a modern convex optimization solver such as CVX [6] . The minimax solution is found to be 0.235 which agrees with the value from equation (8) . In order to provide an insight on why the majority voting rule is the optimal decision for the defender, from the estimation policies we will isolate the one for majority voting and we will take the maximum over that column and prove that it always provides a larger probability than every other policy of the defender. For the scenario above, the probability of that estimation policy is 0.5502 which is larger than the probabilities of using the other estimation policies and almost double from the minimax solution.
The assumptions of Theorem 1 expressed by the inequalities (5)- (7) are mild in that these inequalities hold for large ranges of parameters (c.f. Figure 2) .
Conveniently, the optimal policy (9) for the detector is largely independent of the attack probability p attack , whose value may be difficult to know precisely. In essence, as long as the probability of attack does not exceed the bound (7), the detector's policy only depends on p attack because of the threshold condition
in the definition of y 2 . When this condition holds true, the optimal estimator is a pure majority rule (y 2 " 0), otherwise it is the mixed policy given in (9) . The threshold condition is plotted in Figure 3 for a scenario with 21 sensors. While the detector's policy may depend little on p attack , that is obviously not the case for the probability of error v˚corresponding to the saddle-point solution. For example, for very small probabilities of error, the saddle point is essentially given by v˚« p attackˆn´m n´1 2˙p n`1 2´m err , Fig. 2 . Maximum value of p attack for which Theorem 1 holds for different values of the probability of error perror and number m of sensors attacked. The surface shown corresponds to the bound in (7) for n " 11 sensors and shows that the theorem is valid for very large attack probabilities as long as perr ď 0.17 and m ď 5. Fig. 3 . Maximum value for p attack , below which the optimal detection policy in (9) corresponds to a pure majority rule (y 2 " 0). The surface shown corresponds to the boundary for which β " p n´m err in the definition of y 2 for n " 21 sensors.
which shows a probability of error that scales linearly with the attack probability. This formula also shows that the probability of error scales with the number of sensors as
In the absence of attacks (for which the majority rule would be optimal), we can conclude from Lemma 1 that the probability of error is given by
which, for a small probability of error, scales with the number of sensors as
From the perspective of the scaling laws (11) and (12), it is as if each one of the m sensors compromised effectively decreases the total number of sensors by 2m.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a new game theoretic approach to estimate a binary random variable based on a vector of sensor measurements that may have been corrupted by an attacker. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum partial information game in which a detector attempts to minimize the probability of error and an attacker attempts to maximize this probability. Closed form solutions are provided for the attacker and detector policies by using policy domination and exploring symmetries. We are currently extending these results to heterogeneous sensors and dynamic estimation problems.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. By the law of total probability, we can expand P µ,δ pX ‰ Xq " 
where we used the facts that
We now proceed to compute the conditional probabilities in the formula above, that can also be expanded as follows:
where E attack denotes the events that the attacker manipulated measurements and E attack the complementary event.
When no measurements have been manipulated, we simply have that The result follows from this and (13).
